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II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

This is a response brief of the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD). Petitioner Ryan
Satter (Satter) requests this Court to reverse the decision of the District Court, who determined that
the requirements of Idaho Code Section l 8-8002A were met and that Satter' s driving privileges

should be suspended for ninety (90) days.
B. Course of Proceedings

Satter was arrested on November 3, 2019 and issued a Notice of Suspension. R., at 4-5. On
or about November 8, 2019 Satter, through counsel, requested a hearing with ITD. R., at 15-18.
The hearing was held on November 27, 2019. R., at 53. On December 4, 2019 the hearing officer
issued his decision upholding the ninety (90) day administrative license suspension beginning on
December 3, 2019 through March 2, 2020. R., 53-62. The Petition for Judicial Review was filed
on or about December 4, 2019. CR, at 5. On December 5, 2019, the District Court issued an Order
staying the license suspension pending this appeal. CR., at 21-22. Oral argument was heard by the
District Court on May 26, 2020 and the District Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order
on Jun 19, 2020 upholding the decision of the hearing officer. CR., at 52-60.
C. Statement of Facts

On November 3 2019, Officer Fox observed a vehicle driven by Satter with a passenger
headlight that was not working. The officer also observed the vehicle making slow turns and
swerving within its lane. The officer initiated a traffic stop. The officer identified Satter and
suspected Satter had been drinking. The officer conducted field sobriety tests, which Satter
failed. R., at 10-11. The officer read Satter his rights via Idaho Code Section 18-8002. R., Exhibit
J (DVD). During the relevant portion of the reading, Officer Fox stated:
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" ... You have the right to an Administrative Hearing on the suspension before the Idaho
Department of Transportation Department to show cause why you failed the evidentiary
testing and/ail to pass the testing and do not .... Okay, I'm going to start over. You have
the right to an Administrative Hearing on the suspension before the Idaho Transportation
Department to show why you failed the evidentiary test and why your license should not

be suspended....
R., Exhibit J. Then the officer gave Satter breath tests. Satter failed the breath tests (.123/.129).
R., at 6. Satter was issued a "Suspension and Mandatory Ignition Interlock Advisory" (also called
a Notice of Suspension) and was mwsted for DUI. Id.

ID. ISSUES PRESENTED
A. Was Satter substantially informed of the consequences of refusal and failure of the test

as required by law?
B. Was the omission to the word "cause" in the re-reading of the advisory a mild
misstatement or passing inadequacy?

C. Was the hearing officer~s decision made upon a lawful procedure?

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The administrativ e license suspension (ALS) statute, LC. § 18-8002A, requires that the

ITD suspend the driver's license of a driver who has failed a BAC test administered by a law
enforcement deputy. Bennettv. State, Dept. ofTransp., 147 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505 (Idaho

App. 2009). The period of suspension is ninety days for a driver's first failure of an evidentiary
test and one yem· for any subsequent test failure within five years. LC.§ 18-8002A(4)(a). A
person who has been notified of an ALS may request a hearing before a hearing officer
designated by the ITD to contest the suspension. LC. § 18-8002A(7). At the administrative
hearing, the burden of proof rests upon the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the
suspension. I.C. § 18-8002A(7); Kane v. State, Dep't ofTransp., 139 Idaho 586, 590, 83 P.3d
130, 134 (Ct.App.2003). The hearing officer must uphold the suspension unless he or she finds,
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by a preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of several grounds enumerated
in LC.§ 18-8002A(7) for vacating the suspension. Those grounds include:
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or was in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other

intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or

18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or
other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, l 8-8004C or 18-8006,
Idaho Code; or
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance with
the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not
functioning properly when the test was administered; or
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing
as required in subsection (2) of this section.
LC. § 18-8002A(7). The hearing deputy's decision is subject to challenge through a petition for

judicial review. LC.§ 18-8002A(8); Kane, 139 Idaho at 589, 83 P.3d at 133.

The Idaho Administrativ e Procedures Act (IDAPA) also governs the review of
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's
license. See I.C. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. ITD has adopted IDAPA rules for

ALS suspensions. See IDAPA 39.02.72.00, et seq. ALS appeals are also governed by the Idaho
Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General. See IDAPA 39.02.72.003. IDAPA
04.11.01.052 provides for liberal construction of the rules and states:

The rules in this chapter will be liberally construed to secure just, speedy and economical
determination of all issues presented to the agency. Unless prohibited by statute, the
agency may permit deviation from these rules when it finds that compliance with them is
impracticable, unnecessary or not in the public interest. Unless required by statute, the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not apply to
contested case proceedings conducted before the agency. (7-1-93)
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In Bennett v. State Department ofTransporta tion, 147 Idaho 141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct App
2009), the Court of Appeals restated the necessary standard of review for the Court reviewing the
decision of the hearing deputy. The Court of Appeals stated, in pertinent part:
This Comt does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence presented. LC. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This
Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998);
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial
competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Bd. ofComm 'rs, 134
Idaho 353,357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; {b) exceed the
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported
by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. LC.§ 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must
demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in LC.§ 67-5279(3) and that a
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd of County
137 Idaho at 340, 48
Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429, 958 P.2d 583,586 (1998); Marshall,
11
be set aside ...
shall
it
appeal,
on
P.3d at 669. If the agency's decision is not affirmed
and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." LC. § 67-5279(3).

Id, at 506-507. Therefore, the burden is on the petitioner to establish that ITD erred in a manner
specified in Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3) and then establish that a substantial right has been
prejudiced. This issue was discussed by the Court of Appeal in State ofIdaho v. Kalani-Keegan,
155 Idaho 297, 311 P.3d 309 (Ct. App. 2013) where the Court stated:
It is well established that the party challenging an agency decision must demonstrate the
agency erred in a manner specified in LC.§ 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that
party has been prejudiced. Wheeler v. Idaho Dep 't ofHealth & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257,
260,207 P.3d 988, 991 (2009).
Further, nothing in IDAPA requires the courts to address these two requirements in any
particular order. Hmvkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 151 Idaho 228,232,254
P.3d 1224, 1228 (2011). Therefore, an agency's decision may be affirmed solely on the
grounds that the petitioner has not shown prejudice to a substantial right. Id. In other
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words, the courts may forego analyzing whether an agency erred in a manner specified by
LC. § 67-5279(3) if the petitioner does not show that a substantial right was violated. Id.

Id., at page 313.
V.ARGUMENT

SATTER WAS SUBSTANTAILLY INFORMED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF

A.

REFUSAL AND FAILURE OF THE TEST
Satter argues that the court should reverse the decision of the District Court because Satter
was not accurately informed of his rights prior to the evidentiary testing. First, he argues that the
advisory was not accurate. Second, he argues that stating that ''to show why" was not convey the
correct legal standard of "to show cause why". For the reasons discussed herein, the arguments
are without legal and factual merit.
1
Here, the officer read the advisory to Satter. During the relevant portion of the reading,

Officer Fox stated:
" ... You have the right to an Administrative Hearing on the suspension before the Idaho

Department of Transportation Department to show cause whvyoufailed the evidentiary
testing andfail to pass the testing and do not .... Okay, I'm going to start over. You have
the right to an Administrative Hearing on the suspension before the Idaho Transportation
Department to show why you failed the evidentiary test and why your license should not
be suspended....
R. Exhibit J. As noted, Officer Fox correctly advised Satter of the standard on the first reading
1

("to show cause why"), then omitted the word "cause" on the second re-reading of the advisory.
As such, Satter was substantially info1med of the language found in Idaho Code Section 188002A(2).

The driver's attorney transcribed parts of the audio recording and the relevant reading by the
officer is located on page 8 of the transcript. See Ag. Rec., Ex. L page 45.
1
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Idaho Law. Idaho law requires that when a person is requested to take an evidentiary test

the person must be advised of their rights. Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(2). But Idaho law
provides that the person shall be "substantially" informed and that he "need not be informed
verbatim." Idaho Code Section l 8-8002A(2) provides the following.
Informat ion to be given. At the time of evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol

or for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, the person shall
be informed that if the person refuses to submit to or fails to complete evidentiary testing,
or if the person submits to and completes evidentiary testing and the test results indicate
an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in
violation of section 18-8004, l 8-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, the person shall be
informed substant ially as follows (but need not be informed verbatim):

* * *
(b) You have the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days of the notice of
suspension of your driver's license to show cause why you refused to submit to or
to complete and pass evidentiary testing and why your driver's license should not
be suspended;

Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(2). (Emphasis added). As previously stated, the information
contained in Idaho Code Section l 8-8002A(2) was read to SATTER.

In Idaho, a Section l 8-8002A license suspension must be vacated if an officer fails to
inform the licensee of certain information, as required by the statute, prior to evidentiary testing.
LC.§ 18-8002A(7)(e); Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 151 Idaho 659,664 ,262 P.3d 1030, 1035
(2011); State v. Kling, 150 Idaho 188, 192,245 P.3d 499,503 (Ct. App. 2010). Here, there is no
dispute that in the advisory read to Satter contained all the information contained in Idaho Code
Section l 8-8002A(2). Therefore, the information read to Satter complied with Idaho law.
Idaho Code Section l 8-8002A and judicial decisions preclude suspension of a driver's
license if the officer does not strictly comply with the statutory directives concerning the
advisory info1mation to be given to motorists when a BAC test is requested. There are several
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Idaho cases which have vacated a license suspension because the police officer (verbally or by

way of a faulty verbal advisory) provided the driver with inaccurate information.
In Cunningham v. State, 150 Idaho 687, 249 P.3d 880 (Ct. App. 2011) the officer
verbally conveyed incorrect informatio n to the driver which did not comport with Idaho Code
Section 18-8002(3). The Court of Appeals explained the facts in Cunningham as follows:
The officer in this case provided a written advisory form and played a recording for
Cunningha m, which conveyed the information required under the statute. However, in
1
response to Cwmi.11gham s questions regarding the consequenc es of refusing testing, the
officer repeatedly asserted that, if Cunningha m refused to cooperate, he would lose his
driver's license for one year, without exception. In addition, in response to Cunningha m's
question regarding whether he could obtain an additional evidentiary test, the officer
stated that Cwmingha m had to wait w1til he bonded out of jail to obtain such a test.
Fhmlly, the officer reiterated that, if Cum1ingham refused to cooperate, he would lose his
chance to prove his innocence. Based on the recording of this exchange and the officer's
testimony at the hearing, the magistrate determined that the officer conveyed incorrect
infonnation regarding Cunningha m's rights and duties should he refuse to submit to
evidentiary testing.

Id., at 691, 249 P.3d at 885. The Court of Appeals declined to uphold the license suspension and
reasoned as follows:
Based on the specific facts of this case, we conclude that the infonnation provided
to Cunningham did not comport with that required by I.C. § 18-8002(3) and, therefore,
rendered the written and recorded advisory given to Cunningha m incomplete. As
mentioned above, the officer inconectly asserted that Cunningha m would immediately
lose his license should he refuse to submit to testing, that he could only obtain additional
evidentiary testing after bonding out of jail, and that he must prove his innocence to the
judge at the show cause hearing. The officer conveyed such inco11·ect information after
II
notifying Cunningham that he specialized" in DUI testing and that he instmcted officers
on how to properly administer field sobriety tests. In addition, before answering any of
Cunningha m's questions, the officer stated that he would explain what the Idaho Code
required and what Idaho com1s have said about the consequenc es of a refusal. The officer
was adamant that the informatio n he conveyed to Cunningha m was the law, even if such
information contradicte d what was previously contained in the written and recorded
advisory. The officer's continuous , repetitive recitation of incorrect information regarding
the consequenc es for refusal rendered the initial advisory incomplete .
We do not intend the holding of this case to require officers to stand mute when
1
answering a driver s questions regarding the infonnation contained in the implied consent
advisory. However, the officer's conduct in this case so contradicte d the information
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provided in the initial advisory that it defeated the purpose of the statute's requirement for
such an advisory in the first place. Here, the officer's repeated asse11ions went beyond
mild misstatements or passing inaccuracies, which may occur during an advisory
involving a presumably intoxicated driver. The magistrate was therefore con-ect in
1
declining to suspend Cunningham s driver's license. Thus, we reverse the district court's
decision and vacate the suspension of Cunningham's license.

Id.
The Hearing Officer correctly rejected the argument that the Court's decision in

Cunningham required that the license suspension be vacated. The Hearing Officer wrote:
5. In the In re Cunningham, 150 Idaho 687 (App.2011), decision, the Idaho Court of
Appeals ruled that "... [T]he officer's continuous, repetitive recitation of incorrect
information regarding the consequences for refusal rendered the initial advisory
incomplete. 11 The officer in the Cunningham case told Cunningham that the BAC test
was the "only opportunity to prove his innocence" and ifhe refused to take the test his
driver's license would be "automatically suspended for one year without exception."
6. In this matter, Officer Fox did not give Satter continuous, repetitive recitation of
2 of 18-8002A
incorrect inf01mation that was described in Cunningham. Section
11
11
indicates that the information conveyed need not be verbatim and given the totality of
11
11
the circumstances the omitted word of cause did not have the same impact that the
improper statutory language had in Virgil.

CR. at 15. The analysis of the Hearing Officer supported his legal conclusion that "[b]ased on
1

the record and the applicable caselaw, Satter was properly advised of the consequences of
refusing or failing evidentiary testing as required by Idaho Code §18-8002 and Idaho Code 188002A. CR., at 16.
In summary, the verbal advisory given to Satter is distinguishable from Cunningham.
Officer Fox did not give repeated assertions of Idaho law. Officer Fox did not make continuous,
repetitive recitations of inconect information. At most, Officer Fox made a mild misstatement
and/or passed an inaccurate statement when he left out the word "cause" on the re-reading of the
advisory. The misstatement by Officer Fox was not sufficient to vacate the license suspension.
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In the case of In the Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 895 P.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1995), the
Court affirmed the reinstatement of a driver's license when the written advisory incorrectly stated
that the driver would be required to "explain why" he had refused an evidentiary test, when the
11
statute required that the driver was required to "show cause for his refusal. In Virgil the Court of

Appeals held that Virgil was not properly advised pursuant to LC. Section 18-8002(3), because
the written advisory used by police "did not properly advise Virgil of his rights and duties under
Idaho's implied consent statute, LC. Section 18-8002." The Court of Appeals explained:
Virgil also challenges paragraph (4)(b) of the advisory form, which notifies the
driver as follows: "You have a right to submit a written request within seven (7) days to
the Magistrate Court of Twin Falls County for a hearing to explain why you refused to
take the tests" (emphasis added). Virgil contends that this provision incorrectly advised
states
him of his bUl'den of proof under LC.§ 18-8002(3)(b). Idaho Code§ 18-8002(3)(b)
11
to
right
the
has
she
or
he
that
informed
be
must
that a driver whose license is seized
request a hearing within seven (7) days to show cause why he refused to submit to, or
complete evidentiary testing 11 (emphasis added). Virgil argues that the phrase, "explain
11
11
why, 11 communicates a lower burden of proof than the phrase, show cause. He also
asserts that the latter phrase connotes legal justification or proof which is not conveyed
by the phrase, ''explain why. 11 We agree.

Our Supreme Comt has stated that the te1m, cause, as contemplated by I.C. §
11

11

18-8002(3)(b), envisions "something more than any reason." Griffiths, 113 Idaho at 372,
744 P.2d at 100, citing State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho I, 704 P.2d 333 (1985). The driver
"must establish cause of a sufficient magnitude that it may be fairly said that a suspension
11
of his license would be unjust or inequitable. Id.; see also Matter of Goerig, 121 Idaho
1
26, 29, 822 P.2d 545, 548 (Ct.App.1991) (' The burden ofproofrests on the defendant to
prove physical inability to take the test or to establish another cause of sufficient
magnitude to refuse to take the test.''). We conclude that the phrase, "show cause," more
the
accurately conveys the driver's burden of proof at the suspension hearing than does
11
no
in
recited
are
18-8002(3)
§
ofl.C.
requirements
the
pluase, "explain why." Because
11
11
rights
their
of
uncertain terms," Beem, supra, and drivers must be completely advised
and duties under that provision, Griffiths, supra, we hold that Virgil was not properly
advised pursuant to LC.§ 18-8002(3).
Id. at 948, 895 P.2d at 184. The Hearing Officer correctly rejected the argument that the Court's
decision in Virgil was applicable. The hearing officer stated the following:
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2. Counsel for Satter argues Officer Fox did not properly inform Satter regarding the
consequences of refusing or failing evidentiary testing when he stopped dUl'ing the
11
reading of the advisory form and said "show why you failed the evidentiary test instead
of "show cause why you failed an evidentiary test." Counsel contends the Virgil v. State
decision, 126 Idaho 946 (App. 1995), emphasized the difference between the words
"explain why" vs. "show cause" in the statutory language found in the suspension
advisory.
3. Virgil ruled that the 1995 statutory language regarding refusals in Section 18-8002(3)
11
11
containing the phrase "explain why was a lower burden of proof that the phase show
11
cause. However, the Virgil ruling pertained to the statutory language and Suspension
Advisory in use at the time. Both have been amended, as shown by Exhibit 1, a copy of
the Suspension Advisory read by Officer Fox and provided to the Petitioner at the scene.
11
Officer Fox read Part 3(B) correctly and said ... show cause why you failed the
evidentiary testing" and then lost his place. In rereading the same section, Officer Fox
inadvertently omitted the word "cause" in his reading.

CR., at 13.
Here, Satter was not incorrectly advised of the burden of proof. Officer Fox told Satter in
the first reading that he [Satter] was required to "show cause why,,. Therefore, Satter was
substantially advised of his rights and duties as required by Idaho law.
B.

THE OMISSION OF THE WORD "CAUSE" IN THE RE-READING OF THE

ADVISORY WAS A MILD MISSTATEIVIENT OR PASSING INADEQUACY
Here, Satter was initially advised to "show cause why" and then to "show why" he failed
the evidentiary test. The District Court found that "the difference between 'show why' and 'show
cause why' is not so great as to warrant reinstating Satter's driving privileges. " The District Court
went on to explain its reasoning as follows:
In Virgil, the court agreed with the driver that "[T]he phrase, 'explain why,'
communicates a lower burden of proof than the phrase, 'show cause.' He also asserts
that the latter phrase connotes legal justificatio n or proof which is not conveyed by the
phrase, 'explain why."' Id The difference between "explain why" and "show cause"
was too great for the comt to ignore this improper advisory, especially since it was used
both in the written form provided the driver and when read aloud.
Unlike Virgil) there is only a minimal difference between the significance of
"show why" and "show cause why." While the word cause indisputabl y has an important
legal connotation, show also has a much stronger meaning than explain. "Explain"
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suggests that nearly any reason given, without additional proof, is sufficient to rescind a
license suspension. "Show" asks more of a driver, and is understood to require additional
evidence of their reasoning. Because these two phrases are fundamentally different, a
different outcome than Vigil is warranted here.
If the phrase "show cause" was never presented to Satter in the advisory, this
decision would be the same. "Show why," especially following the use of "show cause
why," does not fundamentally change the statutory language, and does not render the
advisory defective.

CR., at 57-58. Finally, the District Court specifically rejected Satter's argument. The District
Court found the following:
Here, the arresting officer con-ectly said "show cause why" the first time he read
the advisory, but after misspeak ing on another part of the sentence, started over and said
"show why." While Virgil does call for strict adherence to the statute, and specifically
keys in on the phrase "show cause," the facts here are distinguishable and call for a
different result. In Virgil, the driver never received a proper advisory, whereas here
language in question was read correctly to Satter once and provided to him in written
fo1m. See Virgil, 126 Idaho at 948, 895 P.2d at 184. Because there were two instances
of the correct language used while advising Satter, we turn instead to whether the
statement could be considered a mild misstatement or something more.
R., at 55-66. The Distiict Court continued "the misreading of one word by the arresting officer

was a passing inaccuracy, and does not render the advisory incomplete." R., at 57. The District
Court stated:
His omission of the word "cause" can be chalked up to a reading el'l'or, and Satter has not
present sufficient evidence that the omission of "cause" rendered by his advisory
incomplete. The slip by the officer falls into the passing inaccuracy category, and does
not render the advisory incomplete under Cunningham.
R., at 57.
C.

NO UNLAWFUL PROCEDURE

Satter argues that he was not substantially inf01med of his rights pursuant to Idaho Code
section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, therefore it was an "invalid advisory form" and based upon a
lawful procedure. In effect, Satter argues that because the method of recitation of the advisory
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was incomplete, it was based upon an unlawful procedure. This argument was rejected by the
Hearing Officer and by the District Court.
The Hearing Officer rejected this argument when he wrote:
In this matter, Officer Fox did not give Satter continuous, repetitive recitation of
incorrect information that was described in Cunningham, Section 2 of l 8-8002A
indicates that the information conveyed "need not be verbatim" and give the totality of
the circumstances the omitted word of "cause" did not have the same impact that the
improper statutory language had in Virgil.
The District Court also declined to accept the argument of an unlawful procedure. The
District Court wrote "Satter' s argument relies on a finding that he was not substantially informed
of his rights pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and 18-8002A." As previously discussed,
Satter was substantially informed of his rights.
Furthe1more, if Satter's argument is that the procedure was unlawful because of the
"impact" on Satter, the District Court did not accept this argument. The District Court co1Tectly

held:
Neither Virgil nor the ALS hearing was the case decided on the impact to the driver, but
the impact of the effectiveness of the advisory itself. In Virgil and Cunningham, the
impact described is the effectiveness of the advisory, not the driver's reliance on the
information. As explained above, the advisory here was complete and as such, the
Hearing Officer did not decide the case based upon an unlawful procedure.

CR., at 58-59.

In summary, the method used for the advisory does not render the procedure unlawful.
The focus must be on the effectiveness of the advisory. When the Court finds that the advisory
was complete, then the advisory is also effective and there is no unlawful procedure.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the misreading of one word in the advisory does not render the advisory
incomplete or invalid. ITD respectfully requests that the Court uphold the decision of the
District Court and uphold the license suspension and lift the order staying the license suspension.
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